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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of immigrant remittances on the wages of native workers
in the host country. The model shows that the wage impact of immigration depends on
the competing e⁄ects of an increase in labor market competition and an increase in the
consumer base. Remittances provide a unique way of isolating this latter e⁄ect since they
reduce the consumer base but not the workforce. The predictions of the model are tested
using an unusually rich data set that follows the same individuals over time and has detailed
information on remittances. As expected, the results indicate that a ten percent increase
in remittances depress the wages of native workers by 2.5%. Furthermore, remittances
predominantly a⁄ect workers in non-traded industries that are more reliant on domestic
consumption.
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The amount of money immigrants send home to family and friends in the form of remit-
tances has increased steadily over the past decade and was valued at $416 billion in 2009.2
Remittance ￿ ows into developing countries are large (they exceed o¢ cial aid and are close
to foreign direct investment in￿ ows) and the bene￿ts to recipient developing countries are
well documented.3 However, little is known about how the out￿ ow of remittances a⁄ect the
sending country. This paper ￿lls this gap by presenting a model that examines the relation-
ship between immigration, remittances, and native wages and tests these predictions using
a comprehensive longitudinal data set.
Critics of immigration often focus on the negative labor competing e⁄ects of immigration
caused by the increase in the supply of workers. However, immigrants also demand goods
and services which can alleviate this negative wage impact. Although intuitively appealing,
little work has examined the impact of immigration on the consumer base. In order to clarify
these competing e⁄ects, this paper presents a simple model that identi￿es how immigration
can a⁄ect wages through an increase in labor market competition and an increase in product
demand. Speci￿cally, the model shows that the impact on wages depends crucially on the
ratio of the immigration-induced change in the consumer base relative to the immigration-
induced change in the workforce.
Remittances provide a unique way of identifying changes in this ratio, since remittances
a⁄ect the consumer base but not the workforce. Speci￿cally, as remittances increase, the
domestic consumer base shrinks relative to the workforce, and thus native wages will decline.
In addition, the model predicts that remittances will have a more negative impact on the
wages of native workers in non-traded industries since these industries depend more heavily
on local consumption. The wages of native workers in traded industries are less a⁄ected by
changes in the domestic consumer base.
The predictions of the model are tested using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP). Germany is an especially appealing country to examine because it is
one of the most important remitting countries in the world. From 1984-2008, Germany sent
2World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011.
3See Yang (2011) for a survey of the literature and a comparison of remittances , FDI, and o¢ cial aid.
1abroad on average $9 billion a year in the form of remittances, third most in the world. In
2009, Germany remitted $16 billion which represented 0.5% of German GDP.4
Furthermore, the German SOEP data is a longitudinal data set that surveys the same
individuals every year from 1984 to 2008 and is one of the only micro-level data sets that
measures remittances sent abroad. Thus, it is possible to focus on changes in total remit-
tances from an existing set of immigrants rather than variation in remittances that is driven
by a change in the number of immigrants. The problem with the latter variation is that
new immigrants may directly impact wages by increasing labor supply which would bias the
estimated impact of remittances on wages. By examining changes in remittances from the
same set of immigrants, this analysis focuses on a clean source of variation in the consumer
base while holding the workforce ￿xed.
The empirical speci￿cation essentially examines how changes in the total amount of
remittances leaving a German state a⁄ect the wages of individual native workers within that
state after controlling for demographic characteristics, state ￿xed e⁄ects, year ￿xed e⁄ects,
and industry ￿xed e⁄ects. One concern is that an income or productivity shock within a
particular state could lead to higher native wages and lead to wealthier immigrants remitting
more money abroad. To address this potential endogeneity concern, this analysis utilizes
an instrumental variable estimation strategy to identify the casual impact of remittance
on wages. The instrument is constructed using variation in remittances that is driven by
changes in foreign country characteristics which are exogenous to local economics conditions.
The results con￿rm the predictions of the model. Even the OLS results, which may
include a spurious positive bias due to endogeneity, indicate that remittances decrease na-
tive wages. The IV results are more negative and indicate that, a ten percent increase in
remittances leads to a 2.5 percent reduction in the wages of native workers within that
state. As the consumer base shrinks relative to the workforce, native wages decline. In
addition, this negative impact predominantly a⁄ects workers employed in non-traded in-
dustries which are more reliant on domestic consumption. The impact of remittances on
workers in traded industries is insigni￿cant because changes in the local consumer base has
a relatively small impact on the demand for these goods and remittances set abroad can
4World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011.
2still be used to purchase these traded goods. Additional sensitivity analyses indicate that
the results are robust to including immigration as an additional control, to the use of an
alternate instrumental variable estimation strategy, and to using a more restricted sample.
Existing studies tend to focus on the impact that remittances have on developing coun-
tries that receive these funds. Typically remittances are found to enhance the economic
performance of the receiving country, including increasing household welfare, reducing
poverty, and insuring against income shocks (The World Bank 2008, Chami et al. 2008,
and Rapoport and Docquier 2006). Other authors examine the characteristics of those that
choose to remit and their motivation for doing so (Lucas and Stark 1985, Funkhouser 1995,
de la Briere et al. 2002, Osili 2007, Dustmann and Mestres 2010, Yang 2011). However,
relatively little is known about how the out￿ ow of remittances a⁄ect the economic per-
formance of the sending country. Given the positive impact of remittances on economic
conditions in developing countries, one might suspect that the implications for the sending
country would be more adverse. To the best of my knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to
speci￿cally examine the implications of remittances on the sending country￿ s economy. Not
surprisingly, this analysis ￿nds that remittances reduce native wages particularly of workers
producing non-traded goods.
While there is limited research into the implications of remittances for developed coun-
tries, there is a large body of work examining whether immigration adversely a⁄ects the
wages of similarly skilled native workers. The results are mixed, with some studies ￿nding
that immigration has a signi￿cant negative impact on native wages (Borjas, Freeman, and
Katz 1997 and Borjas 2003) and others ￿nding a smaller or insigni￿cant impact (Card 1990,
Card 2005, Ottaviano and Peri 2008). While public discourse and previous research often
focuses on the labor market competing e⁄ects of immigration, the implications of immigra-
tion on the consumer base is also important but seldom studied. Mazzolari and Neumark
(2012) and Olney (2012) begin to think more seriously about immigrant consumption by
examining the impact of immigration on the number and type of business establishments.
However, this is the only empirical paper, that I am aware of, that focuses on how an
immigrant-induced change in the consumer base a⁄ects native wages.
The model presented in this paper is similar to the framework outlined in Borjas (2009),
3which examines the impact of immigration on wages in a wide variety of more general
functional forms. In contrast, this paper makes very simple assumptions about the utility
and production functions and yet still predicts that immigration￿ s impact on wages depends
on the change in the consumer base relative to the change in the workforce. Focusing on
remittances provides a unique opportunity to test the implications of the model, since
remittances change the consumer base but not the workforce. The ability to empirically
test the predictions of the model using an unusual longitudinal micro-level data set that has
information on remittances represents an important contribution of this paper. The results
of this paper provide the ￿rst empirical evidence that immigration can have an signi￿cant
impact on the consumer base and thus wages.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical
framework and the predictions of the model. The empirical speci￿cation is discussed in
section 3 and the data and descriptive statistics are described in section 4. The results
and sensitivity analysis are discussed in sections 5 and 6 respectively. Finally, section 7
concludes.
2 Model
The goal of this section is to provide a simple and intuitive theoretical framework in which
to examine how remittances a⁄ect native wages. This is accomplished by ￿rst identifying
how immigration can impact wages through an increase in labor market competition and
through an increase in the consumer base. Then the impact of remittances on the consumer
base and thus native wages is examined within this framework.
Following Borjas (2009), the model assumes there are two goods in the economy, with
good q produced domestically and good y imported. Complete specialization in produc-
tion ensures that factor price equalization does not hold. This allows for the possibility
that di⁄erences in factor prices across countries provide a motive for migration. If there
was incomplete specialization then factor prices would be equalized across countries and
according to the Rybczynski Theorem, immigration would alter the distribution of output
without leading to any change in wages.
4Assume each consumer j has the following quasilinear utility function:





where ￿ < 1 and g￿
j re￿ ects consumer j0s preference for the domestic good. Let Z be
the consumer￿ s income and thus the budget constraint is:
(2) Z = y + pq,
where p is the price of the domestic good and the price of the imported good is taken
as given (because it is determined in the world market) and treated as the numeraire.
Maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint generates consumer j0s demand function
for the domestic good:
(3) qj = gjp￿1=(1￿￿),
where gj is a rescaled consumer speci￿c preference.5
The three types of consumers in this economy are domestic workers, domestic capitalists,
and consumers in other countries. All consumers have the same quasilinear utility function
speci￿ed in (1) but the weighting factor g di⁄ers across the types of consumers. This allows
for the possibility that the consumers may di⁄er in their preference for the domestically
produced good. Let CL be the number of domestic workers, CK be the number of domestic
capitalists, and CX be the number of foreign consumers. Thus, the market demand for the
domestic good (Q) is de￿ned as follows:
Q = qLCL + qKCK + qXCX
5Given the quasilinear utility function, product demand is not a function of income. See Borjas (2009)
for an extension that includes these wealth e⁄ects.
5which, after substituting in equation (3), becomes
(4) Q = Cp￿1=(1￿￿);
where C = gLCL + gKCK + gXCX is the weighted number of consumers.
While often overlooked by previous research, this model provides a useful framework in
which to think about how immigration a⁄ects product demand. In (4), an increase in the
size of the workforce due to immigration can a⁄ect product demand in two ways. It can
lead to a movement along the existing product demand curve as the price of the domestic
good changes or it can shift the product demand curve itself as the weighted number of
consumers, C, changes.
More speci￿cally, let ￿ = dlogC=dlogL represent the change in the (weighted) number of
consumers due to an immigration-induced change in the number of workers. ￿ can re￿ ect a
number of di⁄erent ways in which immigration can a⁄ect the consumer base. For instance,
immigration may lead to a substantial increase in the number of domestic consumers but
only a trivial decline in the number of foreign consumers. Even if the increase in CL is
fully o⁄set by a decline in CX, there may be a home bias in consumption where immigrants
preference for the domestic good increases from gX to gL.
If ￿ = 1, then immigration leads to a proportionately equal increase in the size of the
consumer base and the size of the workforce. Borjas (2009) refers to this case as product
market neutrality. However, the impact of immigration can be non-neutral in the sense that
the in￿ ux of workers can lead to a larger or smaller change in the number of consumers. For
instance, if immigrants are conspicuous consumers of the domestic good than the consumer
base may increase by more than the workforce (￿ > 1). Conversely, if the consumer base
increases by less than the workforce then ￿ < 1.
From (4) the following inverse demand function is given:
(5) p = C￿Q￿￿;
6where ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ > 0 is the inverse price elasticity of demand.
The domestic good is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function:6
(6) Q = K￿L1￿￿:
In a competitive market factors are paid their value of marginal product, and thus the
wage and the rental rate on capital are de￿ned as follows:
(7) w = (1 ￿ ￿)C￿Q1￿￿L￿1;
(8) r = ￿C￿Q1￿￿K￿1:
Using (7) and (8), it is possible to examine the impact of immigration on wages in the
short-run and in the long-run, where in the short-run the capital stock is ￿xed (dK = 0)
and in the long-run the price of capital is ￿xed (dr = 0). Taking logs and di⁄erentiating
(7) gives the following key short-run relationship between immigration and wages (i.e. the




= ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿):
The impact of immigration on wages consists of two terms. If there is product market
neutrality (￿ = 1), the wage impact of immigration reduces to just the second term in (9)
which is unambiguously negative since 0 < ￿ < 1 and 0 < ￿ < 1. By comparison, in a
basic one good framework, the wage elasticity of immigration is simply equal to ￿￿. Since
the inverse price elasticity of demand is between zero and one (0 < ￿ < 1), the short-run
6See Borjas (2009) for results using more general functional forms, including a CES production function.
Since the results are similar, I choose to focus on the simpler Cobb-Douglas production function.
7impact of immigration on wages is now less negative when one allows for immigration to
a⁄ect product demand. Furthermore, the impact of immigration on wages becomes less
negative as the output elasticity of labor (￿) decreases and as the inverse price elasticity of
demand (￿) increases.
If immigrants are conspicuous consumers of the domestic product (￿ > 1), then the
negative impact of immigration on wages is further attenuated. The ￿rst term in (9), which
is now positive, partially o⁄sets the negative e⁄ect of the second term. However, if the
consumer base increases by less than the workforce (￿ < 1), then the ￿rst term in (9) will
be negative and this will exacerbate the negative impact of immigration on wages. Thus,
the impact of immigration on wages depends crucially on the immigration-induced change
in the (weighted) number of consumers relative to the change in the number of workers.
It is also possible to examine the impact of immigration on wages in the long-run where
the price of capital is ￿xed. Taking logs and di⁄erentiating (7) and (8), generates the






1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
:
With product market neutrality (￿ = 1), equation (10) generates the standard result
that immigration has no impact on wages in the long-run. The capital stock increases by
the same proportion as the immigration-induced increase in the workforce which leaves the
capital to labor ratio constant and thus wages do not change. However, if ￿ > 1, then
immigration has a positive impact on wages in the long-run and if ￿ < 1, then immigration
has a negative impact on wages in the long-run. Therefore, in both the short-run and in
the long-run, ￿ plays a critical role in determining the impact of immigration on wages.
Remittances o⁄ers a unique opportunity to identify changes in ￿. Speci￿cally, as a ￿xed
number of immigrants send more money to foreign countries in the form of remittances, the
consumer base will decrease relative to the workforce. From (9) and (10) we see that as ￿
decreases, domestic wages in the short-run and in the long-run decrease. This leads to the
7See the Appendix for the derivations.
8following proposition:
Proposition 1 Holding the workforce constant, as immigrants send more money abroad in
the form of remittances, the domestic consumer base shrinks, and domestic wages decline.
It is also informative to consider how the characteristics of the domestically produced
good, Q, can a⁄ect the relationship between remittances and wages. Suppose, for instance,
that Q is a traded good. Since, traded goods are consumed by both domestic and foreign
consumers, the consumption weights gX and gL are going to be relatively similar. Thus,
remittances will have a smaller e⁄ect on the consumer base, since the foreign residents that
receive the remittances will have similar preferences for the domestically produced good.
Therefore, if Q is a traded good, remittances will have relatively small impact on ￿ and on
domestic wages.
However, if Q is a non-traded good than the preference for this domestically produced
good is much higher among domestic consumers than foreign consumers, gL > gX. Speci￿-
cally, if foreign consumers purchase none of the domestically produced good, then gX = 0.
Thus, as immigrants remit money abroad, the demand for the domestically produced good
will decrease substantially. Little of the money sent home by immigrants will be spent on
the non-tradeable domestically produced good and thus the weighted number of consumers
will decrease signi￿cantly. Therefore, if Q is a non-traded good, remittances will reduce ￿
and domestic wages by relatively more.8 This distinction between non-traded and traded
goods leads to the second proposition of the model:
Proposition 2 Holding the workforce constant, remittances will have a more negative im-
pact on the wages of domestic workers producing non-traded goods than on the wages of
domestic workers producing traded goods.
The model laid out in this section provides a simple theoretical framework in which to
examine the impact of remittances on native wages and generates two important predictions.
8It is worth noting that if immigrant￿ s preferences for the domestically produced good remain exaclty
the same after migrating, then remittances will have a limited impact on the consumer base and wages.
Remittances will simply shift money from immigrant consumers with gx preferences to foreign consumers
with the same preferences for the domestic good. In addition, there will be no di⁄erence between the impact
of remittances on wages in traded and non-traded industries. The empirical results of this paper provide no
support for either of these predictions.
9However, Propositions 1 and 2 are very general, intuitive results that are not speci￿c to
the assumptions of this particular model. These predictions hold under a wide array of
assumptions and function forms (see Borjas 2009). The remainder of the paper examines
whether there is empirical evidence supporting these two key propositions of the model.
3 Empirical Speci￿cation
To test the ￿rst proposition of the model, the empirical analysis will examine whether
￿ uctuations in total remittances at the state level a⁄ect the wages of native workers within
these states. Speci￿cally, the following equation will be estimated using OLS:
(11) lnwist = ￿0 + ￿1 lnremitst + ￿0
2Xit + ￿s + ￿t +  n + "ist;
where wist is the real wage of native worker i, in state s, and in year t. remitst is total real
remittances from state s in year t. Xit is a vector of control variables that include individual
characteristics that often a⁄ect wages, such as education, age, age squared, marital status,
and gender. Finally, ￿s are state ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿t are year ￿xed e⁄ects,  n are industry
￿xed e⁄ects, and "ist is an error term. All speci￿cations have robust standards errors which
are clustered at the state-year level in order to account for the possibility that the error
terms are correlated. This might be the case since the dependent variable is measured at
the individual-year level while the independent variable of interest is at the state-year level.
Finally, all regressions are weighted by the state sample size.
This empirical strategy essentially asks whether native workers in states that experience
an increase in the out￿ ow of remittances see a decline in their wage. Given the predictions of
the model, we would expect that as immigrants send money abroad, the domestic consumer
base shrinks relative to the workforce. As ￿ decreases, local wages decline, and thus ￿1 < 0.
Despite the inclusion of state, year, and industry ￿xed e⁄ects and a variety of control
variables, one may be concerned about endogeneity. Speci￿cally, an income or productivity
shock within a particular state could cause native wages to increase and also enable wealthier
10immigrants to remit more money home. This would generate a spurious positive bias in
the ￿1 coe¢ cient, which would, if anything, attenuate the results. However, to correct for
this potential endogeneity issue, the subsequent analysis will use an instrumental variable
(IV) estimation strategy to identify a causal impact of remittances on wages. The speci￿c
construction of this instrument will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, but
essentially the instrument identi￿es variation in remittances that is driven by foreign country
factors and eliminates variation that is driven by local state characteristics.
To test the second proposition, equation (11) is separately estimated for workers in
traded and non-traded industries. Given the predictions of the model, remittances from
a particular state will have a more negative impact on the wages of workers producing
non-traded goods. These non-traded industries, such as services, depend more heavily on
local consumption and are thus more sensitive to a reduction in demand that results from
immigrants sending money abroad.
4 Data
4.1 Wages and Remittances
To empirically test the predictions of the model, one needs micro-level data on remittances
and wages. While there are numerous data sets that quantify the in￿ ow of remittances into
various countries, there is very little information about where these remittances are coming
from.9 The only panel data set, that I am aware of, that has micro-level information on
immigrant remittances is the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).10
One appealing feature of the SOEP data set is that it is longitudinal study that fol-
lows the same residents over a long period of time (1984-2008). This provides a unique
opportunity to identify a clean source of variation in remittances. Speci￿cally, the value of
remittances can increase due to existing immigrants remitting more money home or because
new immigrants may also choose to remit. This latter variation in remittances can be prob-
lematic since new immigrants increase the workforce and can directly a⁄ect native wages
9The World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook does provide estimates on remittance out￿ ows
but only at the country level.
10Both Dustmann and Mestres (2010) and D￿ Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2010) also use this SOEP data.
11through the labor supply e⁄ects shown in the model. Fortunately, the SOEP longitudinal
data set, allows me to focus on changes in remittances from an existing set of immigrants.
Thus, this data set provides a clean way of identifying how remittances a⁄ect wages while
holding the number of immigrants and workforce ￿xed.11
Beginning in 1984 SOEP surveyed 5,921 West-German households, including those with
both native and foreign heads of household. There has been some attrition over the sub-
sequent twenty four years and new subsamples of residents have been added to the SOEP
data set.12 SOEP asks a comprehensive list of survey questions and provides information
on wages, remittances, location, and demographic characteristics which are especially useful
for this analysis.
The remittance data from SOEP is not available for years 1992 and 1994, and the method
of surveying respondents about remittances changes slightly in 1996. Despite this, the SOEP
data provides the best micro-level panel data on immigrant remittances. Immigrants can
be de￿ned using information on nationality or country of birth, both of which are provided
by SOEP. These two measures are virtually identical, however the nationality measure has
better coverage and is thus used to de￿ne an immigrant. One issue with the nationality
measure is that some immigrants obtain German citizenship during the sample. Thus, a
person is classi￿ed as an immigrant if their nationality di⁄ered from German at any point
in the sample. This foreign country is then used as the immigrants country of origin.
In a given year, the sum of immigrant remittances is calculated for each West-German
state.13 These nominal remittance sums are then de￿ ated using the German Consumer
Price Index (2005=100) available from OECD.stat. Finally, the natural logarithm of this
is taken to generate the following remittance variable:
11It is not possible to calculate the number of immigrants per state using SOEP because by de￿nition
this will not change given the longitudinal nature of the data. Instead, section 6.1 incorporates immigration
data from another source and ￿nds that the results are robust to the inclusion of this additional control.
12The analysis in section 6.3 shows that the results are not sensitive to excluding these changes in the
sample.
13The West-German states are: Berlin; Schleswig-Holstein; Hamburg; Lower Saxony; Bremen; North
Rhine-Westphalia; Hesse; Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland; Baden-Wuerttemberg; and Bavaria. Given
the lack of remittance data and the small sample size, East German states were not included in the analysis.









This is the key independent variable in the analysis that follows.14
While immigrant remittances are aggregated up to the state-year level, the wages of
native workers remain at the individual level. Thus, the key dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of individual real annual labor earnings of each native worker. The
di⁄erent level of aggregation between the dependent and independent variable is useful
because it allows individual characteristics of the native worker to be controlled for, such
as years of education, age, age squared, marital status, and gender. Finally, the sample of
native workers is restricted to heads of households who are between 18 and 65 years old.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Estimates from the World Bank, indicate that Germany is one of the most important
remittance source countries in the world.15 From 1984 to 2008, Germany remitted on
average $9 billion a year, third most in the world behind only the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. In
2009, Germany remitted $16 billion which represented 0.5% of German GDP. Furthermore,
German remittances increased dramatically from $4 billion in 1984 to $15 billion in 2008.
This increase is consistent with the growing importance of remittance ￿ ows worldwide.
The SOEP data represents a small component of these overall aggregate remittance
￿ ows. However, changes in immigrant remittances within the SOEP data are likely corre-
lated with more general remittance out￿ ows from Germany. Fortunately, immigrants were
overrepresented in the original 1984 SOEP sample, accounting for approximately a third
of the head of households surveyed. Each immigrant remitted on average e1,122 per year
which represented 6% of their income. Of those that remitted a positive amount, the average
14I chose not to divide total remittances by the population due to concerns that the population could be
correlated with wages. Furthermore, due to the longitudinal nature of the data, the state population does
not change signi￿cantly. Thus, the state ￿xed e⁄ects in the current speci￿cation will account for di⁄erences
in remittances due to the size of the state. Not surprisingly, the results are virtually identical using the
current measure of remittances or using an alternate remittance-per-person measure.
15World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011.
13was e5,782 per year or 23% of their income.
This analysis exploits di⁄erences in remittances across West-German states. Figure 1
shows the average out￿ ow of remittances from West-German states. Rhineland-Palatinate
and Saarland are treated as one geographic unit in the SOEP data which is re￿ ected in Fig-
ure 1. In addition, there is substantial di⁄erences across states, with Baden-Wuerttemberg
and North Rhine-Westphalia remitting a large amount while Bremen, Hamburg, and Schleswig-
Holstein remit relatively little. The relatively low remittance values in these northern states
is a result of the limited number of immigrants in the sample and not that average remit-
tances per immigrant is necessarily lower. However, many of these di⁄erences across states
will be absorbed by the state ￿xed e⁄ects and thus the empirical strategy focuses on changes
within states over time.
Figure 2 identi￿es the countries to which these remittances are sent.16 Remittance
out￿ ows are predominantly sent to Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, and Spain.
Due to strong economic growth, West Germany saw an increase in foreign-born workers
from 0.6% in 1957 to 11.2% in 1973 predominantly from Southern European countries
and Turkey (Dustmann and Mestres 2010). Thus, immigrants from these countries were
signi￿cantly represented in the initial SOEP sample and remittances to these countries are
relatively large.17
The SOEP data used in this analysis includes 23 years (1984-2008, excluding 1992 and
1994), spans 11 di⁄erent West-German states, and includes 13,708 native Germans and 5,902
immigrants. The summary statistics are reported in Table 1. They indicate a substantial
amount of variation in individual native wages and in total state remittances. In addition,
Table 1 indicates that household heads have on average 12 years of education and are on
average 44 years old. In addition, 60% of the heads of households are married and 68% are
male.
To gain a sense of the variation in the data utilized in this analysis, the residuals are
obtained from separately regressing real native wages and real remittances on the controls
and ￿xed e⁄ects. Figure 3 then plots the average wage residuals at the state-year level
16It is assumed that immigrants send remittances to their country of origin.
17Although, in the descriptive statistics Yugoslavia is treated as one country, in the IV analysis that follows
remittances are more carefully assigned to speci￿c countries within the former Yugoslavia.
14against the remittance residuals. Two things are worth noting. First, in some years the
northern states mentioned earlier have relatively limited remittance out￿ ows. Although
these outlier observations attenuate the relationship between wages and remittances, I think
it is preferable to include the full set of West-German states in this analysis. Instead of
dropping these observations, the regressions that follow are weighted by the state sample
size in order to minimize the e⁄ect of large ￿ uctuations in remittances due to a small sample
size.18
Second and perhaps more importantly, there is a slight negative correlation between
remittances and average wages in Figure 3. This supports the predictions of the model.
However, this correlation is weak, perhaps because of a positive endogeneity bias, and
certainly does not imply causation. Thus, it is necessary to identify an exogenous source
of variation in remittances in order to examine the causal impact of remittances on wages.
The next section discusses the instrument used in this paper.
4.3 Instrument
Variation in immigrant remittances is likely driven both by factors in the foreign source
country and by German economic conditions. Since the latter e⁄ect is almost certainly
correlated with German wages, it would be appealing to identify and use the variation in
remittances that is due to foreign country factors. To gain a sense of the variation in remit-
tances in the data, Figure 4 plots remittances by Turkish and Yugoslavian immigrants in
Germany from 1984 to 2008 and identi￿es some important events that may have in￿ uenced
remittances.19 A number of observations are worth noting.
First, there is a downward trend in remittances over time in Figure 4. This is likely
due to the fact that remittances decrease with the length of time the immigrant has been
in Germany and that there is attrition in the SOEP data set. The inclusion of year ￿xed
e⁄ects should account for both factors.20 Second, remittances to Turkey and Yugoslavia
18The results are similar if the regressions are unweighted or if these three northern states are dropped
from the analysis altogether.
19By no means are these are the only, or even the most important, events in￿ uencing remittances. Rather
these are simply some key events within Turkey and Yugoslovia that may have in￿ uenced remittances and
that help motivate the choice of instrument used in this analysis.
20Section 6.3 more carefully addresses the issue of attrition and indicates that the basline results are robust
to using an alternate, more restrictive sample.
15exhibit some common trends that are likely driven by German economic conditions. For
instance, remittances to both countries fall after 2001 when German GDP growth begins to
slow. This type of variation in remittances is potentially problematic since slow economic
growth may also reduce domestic wages, which would lead to a spurious positive bias in the
OLS coe¢ cient.21 Third, and most importantly, remittances to Turkey and Yugoslavia are
related to shocks in these foreign countries which are likely exogenous to German wages.
For instance, in 1999 a powerful 7.4 magnitude earthquake struck the Turkish city of
Izmit. The earthquake killed 17,000 people, injured 50,000, left 500,000 people homeless,
and caused $3 to $6.5 billion of damage.22 Not surprisingly, the top panel of Table 4 in-
dicates that Turkish immigrants in Germany remitted more money after this devastating
earthquake. Similarly, remittances from Yugoslavian immigrants in Germany remain rel-
atively high through the 1990￿ s as Yugoslavia broke apart and plunged into war. These
country speci￿c events are likely exogenous to German wages and are thus the variation in
remittances that will be useful for this analysis. One practical di¢ culty is that the source
of these country speci￿c shocks vary substantially and could include a wide range of factors,
such as natural disasters, wars, elections, exchange rate ￿ uctuations, and foreign economic
conditions. Rather than trying to measure each of these factors individually, which would
be di¢ cult, this analysis uses a more general ￿xed e⁄ect strategy to identify variation in
remittances that is driven by foreign country characteristics.23
Speci￿cally, for each immigrant who remitted money abroad, there is data on their
individual characteristics, their West-German state of residence, and their country of origin.
Thus, remittances are regressed on individual demographic characteristics, state*year ￿xed
e⁄ects, and country*year ￿xed e⁄ects. While not the focus of this analysis, this intermediate
step in the construction of the remittance IV is interesting because it indicates what types
of immigrants are most likely to remit. The results are reported in Table 2 and indicate
that more educated, older, single, males are relatively more likely to remit money.
The state*year ￿xed e⁄ects in this regression capture changes in remittances that are
21Technically, for this to be a concern, the severity of the German recession has to vary across states
and be correlated with remittances and wages. Any national trends will be controlled for by the year ￿xed
e⁄ects.
22Source: U.S. Geological Survey (http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eq_depot/1999/eq_990817/)
23Section 6.2 discusses an alternate IV strategy that focuses exclusively on natural disasters.
16common to immigrants within a particular state in a given year. Since the goal is to
eliminate the variation in remittances that could be driven by unobserved factors at the state
level which may be correlated with wages, these state*year ￿xed e⁄ects are discarded. The
individual characteristics are also discarded. Instead, the coe¢ cients on the country*year
￿xed e⁄ects are used to construct the instrument. This captures changes in remittances
that are driven by foreign country characteristics and that are exogenous to local economic
conditions. For instance, the 1999 earthquake in Izmit likely caused Turkish immigrants
to send more money home to family and friends regardless of the German state that the
immigrant lived in. This variation in remittances would be captured by the country*year
￿xed e⁄ect but not by the state*year ￿xed e⁄ect. This predicted amount of remittances
for each immigrant based on their country of origin is then aggregated up to the state-year
level.24 Finally, this sum is divided by the CPI and logged in the manner outlined in (12),
which generates the remittance instrument.
5 Results
5.1 Wages and Remittances
The OLS results from estimating (11) are reported in Table 3. All results have robust and
clustered standard errors in brackets, include state, year, and industry ￿xed e⁄ects, and
are weighted by the state sample size. Column 1 excludes the controls while column 2
includes the individual demographic characteristics of the native worker. Consistent with
Proposition 1 of the model, both speci￿cations indicate that immigrant remittances have a
negative impact on the wages of native German workers. For instance, the results in column
2 indicate that a one percent increase in the out￿ ow of remittances from a particular state
leads to a 0.03% decline in the wages of native workers within that state. The coe¢ cients
on the demographic controls are signi￿cant and of the expected sign. Wages are increasing
with years of education and with age (although decreasing with age squared). Marital status
does not have a signi￿cant impact on wages but males earn relatively more.
24Prior to the summation, a constant is added to all the remittance ￿tted values to ensure that they are
all positive. This is necessary so that when taking logs these ￿tted values are not converted to missing. As
long as the ￿tted values are positive, the results are not sensitive to the size of the constant.
17The strong negative e⁄ect of remittances on wages observed in Table 3 is consistent
with the predictions of the model. However, it is somewhat surprising that such a negative
relationship emerges, despite the likely spurious positive endogeneity bias in these OLS
results. The IV analysis will limit these endogeneity concerns by identifying a causal impact
of remittances on wages. The ￿rst stage IV results are presented in Table 4 and indicate
that the remittance instrument is a good predictor of actual remittances. The coe¢ cients
on the remittance IV are positive and signi￿cant at the one percent level and the F-stat on
the excluded instrument is 14, which indicates that the instrument is relatively strong.
The second stage IV results are reported in Table 5. The results in both columns include
state, year, and industry ￿xed e⁄ects while column 2 also includes individual demographic
controls. Both speci￿cations indicate that remittances have a negative impact on native
wages. Speci￿cally, the results in column 2 indicate that a one percent increase in remit-
tances leads to a 0.25% decrease in the wages of native workers, which is signi￿cant at the
one percent level. This result is, again, consistent with proposition 1 of the model. As
German immigrants remit more money abroad, the domestic consumer base shrinks, and
thus domestic wages fall.
While the coe¢ cient on remittances is negative in both the OLS and IV speci￿cations,
the IV coe¢ cient is much larger. The more positive OLS results are consistent with the
endogeneity concern that should introduce a spurious positive bias in the OLS coe¢ cients.
Speci￿cally, a local income or productivity shock within a state may increase native wages
and also lead wealthier immigrants to remit more. However, in the IV analysis the varia-
tion in remittances is driven only by exogenous factors in the foreign country and thus this
spurious positive bias is eliminated. Therefore, not surprisingly, the remittance coe¢ cients
in the IV regressions in Table 5 are more negative than the OLS results from Table 3. How-
ever, both the OLS and IV results indicate that remittances have a negative and signi￿cant
impact on local wages which con￿rms proposition 1 of the model.
5.2 Traded and Non-Traded Industries
According to the second proposition of the model, remittances should have a more negative
impact on native wages in non-traded industries since these industries are more reliant on
18domestic consumption. Traded industries are less sensitive to changes in domestic con-
sumption and foreign residents who receive the remittances can still purchase these traded
goods. Thus, the second proposition is tested by comparing the impact of remittances on
the wages of workers in traded and non-traded industries.
Column 1 of Table 6 reports the OLS results when the sample is limited to workers
in traded industries and column 2 reports the OLS results when the sample is limited to
workers in non-traded industries.25 A one percent increase in remittances has no impact on
the wages of workers in traded industries but decreases the wages of workers in non-traded
industries by 0.05%. Consistent with Proposition 2 of the model, remittances have a more
negative impact on the wages of workers in non-traded industries.
The IV results for the traded and non-traded industries are reported in columns 3 and
4 respectively. The di⁄erence between the impact of remittances on traded and non-traded
industries is now even more pronounced. Speci￿cally, in column 3, remittances have a small
and insigni￿cant impact on the wages of workers in traded industries. However, in column 4,
remittances have a large, negative, and signi￿cant impact on wages. Speci￿cally, a one per-
cent increase in remittances leads to a 0.36% decrease in the wages of workers in non-traded
industries. This is consistent with the second proposition of the model that remittances
will have a more substantial impact on the demand for non-traded goods and thus more
adversely a⁄ect the wages of workers in these industries. Virtually all of the estimated
impact of remittances on native wages is driven by these non-traded industries. Thus, the
results in Table 6 provide further evidence that remittances decrease wages and indicate
that the impact is strongest in industries that are more dependent on local consumption.
One potential concern, is that a foreign country shock could a⁄ect remittances and the
demand for German traded goods. This would violate the exclusion restriction of the IV
analysis since a foreign country shock could a⁄ect wages through a channel other than
remittances. For instance, a negative GDP shock in Turkey will lead Turkish immigrants
in Germany to remit more money home. This is the type of variation is exploited by the
25Traded industries include Agriculture, Trade, Mining, Transport, Manufacturing, Energy, and Finance,
while non-traded industries are Services, Construction, and Other. Based on this de￿nition, 36% of workers
are in traded industries and 64% are in non-traded industries. The results are robust to alternate de￿nitions
of traded and non-traded industries.
19IV strategy. However, in addition, Turkey may also demand fewer German goods, due
to their recession, which will depress wages in German traded industries.26 Although this
scenario could bias the results, the direction of this bias would work against the ￿ndings in
Table 6. Speci￿cally, this would generate a spurious negative bias in the traded industry
coe¢ cient only. However, despite this potential bias, the non-traded industry results in
Table 6 are more negative than the traded industry results. This suggests that either this
story is relatively unimportant or that the actual disparity between traded and non-traded
industries is even larger than the results in Table 6 indicate.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
6.1 Controlling for Immigration
The SOEP survey follows the same individuals over time, which provides a clean way of
identify changes in remittances that are unrelated to the number of immigrants. This is
especially appealing for this analysis because new immigrants can a⁄ect both the out￿ ow of
remittances and wages directly through labor market competition. So the ability to identify
changes in remittances from a ￿xed set of immigrants represents an important bene￿t of
the SOEP data.
However, in reality the number of immigrants is likely changing over time and this
could potentially violate the exclusion restriction in the IV analysis. Speci￿cally, a negative
shock in a foreign country likely increases remittances but it could also lead to an increase
in immigration which may directly depress German wages. For instance, the earthquake
in Izmit likely leads Turkish immigrants in German to remit more money home. The
earthquake may also cause some residents of Turkey to migrate to Germany.27 These new
immigrants may directly depress wages by competing with native Germans for jobs. This
example would generate a spurious negative bias in my results and would be problematic
26Technically, the reduction in demand for German traded goods has to occur in the German states that
have a higher proportion of Turkish immigrants, which seems unlikely. These states are where the shock to
remittances, driven by a fall in Turkish GDP, will be relatively large.
27These new immigrants may be more likely to migrate to the states where their countrymen are already
located. These are the states in which remittances to Turkey are relatively high and responsive to shocks
in Turkey.
20for the conclusions of this paper.
In order to address this potential concern, it would be appealing to explicitly control
for immigration in the empirical speci￿cation. This would alleviate the potential for foreign
shocks to a⁄ect native wages through changes in the number of immigrants. However, one
drawback of the SOEP data is that the longitudinal structure does not allow estimates on
immigration by state and year to be calculated. Instead, population data by West-German
states was obtained from the Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis).
The foreign population data from Destatis has a number of important limitations. First,
immigrant data for the years 1988,1989, and 1990 is missing. These values are calculated
using linear interpolation at the state level. Second, Germany de￿nes an immigrant as a
person without German nationality. Thus, a foreign born resident that becomes a German
citizen is no longer counted as an immigrant. Third, there are continuity issues due to
revisions in the manner in which the data is collected. The year ￿xed e⁄ects should address
this latter concern.28 Despite these limitations, the foreign population data from Destitis is
the best available measure of immigration. The natural logarithm of the immigrant share
of the population is included in the empirical speci￿cation as an additional control.
The IV results are reported in Table 7. In column 1 the baseline results are re-estimated
with the immigration variable included as an additional control. The coe¢ cient on immigra-
tion is insigni￿cant. More importantly, the inclusion of this variable does not signi￿cantly
change the coe¢ cient on remittances. It remains negative, signi￿cant, and of a similar mag-
nitude to the baseline results in Table 5. This is not surprising, since, by construction, the
remittance variable is independent of the number of immigrants. However, these results do
indicate that there is little evidence that immigration is violating the exclusion restriction
of the IV analysis.
Columns 2 and 3 separately estimate the results for traded and non-traded industries.
Immigration has a negative impact on wages in traded industries which is barely signi￿-
cant at the 5% level but an insigni￿cant impact on wages in non-traded industries. More
importantly the inclusion of the immigration variable does not change the coe¢ cient on re-
mittances signi￿cantly in either speci￿cation. Consistent with earlier ￿ndings, remittances
28Given these concerns about the data, I chose not to include this control in the baseline speci￿cation.
21have no impact on the wages of native workers in traded industries but a signi￿cant neg-
ative impact on the wages of workers in non-traded industries. Thus, the inclusion of the
immigrant control does not alter the main conclusions of this paper.
One intriguing aspect of these results is that they suggest that remittances may be
relatively more important than the labor competing impacts of immigration. Speci￿cally,
the potential negative wage impact of immigration might be driven more by a decline in
the consumer base due to remittances than an increase in labor market competition. At
the very least, these ￿ndings suggest that future studies of immigration and wages should
more carefully account for remittances.
6.2 Alternate IV Strategy
One appealing aspect of constructing the instrument using the country*year ￿xed e⁄ect
strategy, is that it can account for a wide variety of foreign country factors that could
in￿ uence remittances. The baseline results indicate that this is an e⁄ective way of identifying
an exogenous source of variation in remittances. However, one potential drawback is that
this method lacks the transparency of a classic IV analysis. This section tries to address
this concern by proposing an alternate IV strategy.
The basic premise of this alternate IV is that German immigrants will remit more to
their home country in response to a large natural disaster. Foreign natural disasters are
clearly exogenous to German native wages and thus should prove to be a useful instrumental
variable. Using foreign natural disasters as an instrument for remittances is a much narrower
approach, relative to the ￿xed e⁄ects strategy used earlier, since it is focusing on one speci￿c
type of event which may be correlated with remittances. However, it is more transparent
which may be appealing.
Data on the number of deaths due to natural disasters by country is obtained from the
International Disaster Database (EM-DAT).29 Deaths due to natural disaster in a foreign
country is linked to the immigrant￿ s country of origin. For instance, 18,021 Turks died
in 1999 due to natural disasters, the most important of which was the Izmit earthquake.
29Natural Disasters include Drought; Earthquake, Epidemic, Extreme Temperature; Flood; Insect Infes-
tation; Mass Movement Dry; Mass Movement Wet; Storm; Volcano; Wild￿re; Complex Disasters; Industrial
Accident; Transport Accident; and Miscellaneous Accident.
22Thus, each Turkish immigrant in Germany is assigned 18,021 deaths in 1999. This exercise
is repeated for all years and for the ￿ve largest German immigrant source countries, which
includes Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, and Spain.30 The instrument is then
calculated as the sum of home country deaths for all immigrants within a particular German
state and year. The out￿ ow of remittances should increase with the number of deaths due
to natural disasters in the home countries of German immigrants.
The ￿rst-stage results using this alternate instrument are reported in Table 8. Consistent
with expectations, the coe¢ cient on the IV is positive and signi￿cant. However the F-Stat
on the excluded instrument is 6.7. Despite this relatively weak instrument, the second
stage IV results in Table 9 are strong and consistent with earlier results. Column 1 in Table
9 indicates that a one percent increase in remittances decreases native wages by 0.39%.
Furthermore, changes in remittances have no impact on the wages of native workers in
traded industries but a negative and signi￿cant impact on the wages of workers in non-
traded industries. The remittance coe¢ cients in Table 9 are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
the corresponding baseline results. The fact that these two vary di⁄erent IV estimation
strategies generate such similar results is reassuring and provides additional support for the
key conclusions of this paper.
6.3 Restricted Sample
One appealing aspect of the SOEP data is that it surveys the same individuals over time.
However, as mentioned before, additional subsamples have been added to the original 1984
sample in order to expand the coverage. In addition, some individuals drop out of the
sample over time due to a number of di⁄erent factors. One concern is that these changes in
the sample may be driving the observed relationship between remittances and wages. To be
problematic for this analysis, these changes would have to be speci￿c to individual states,
since the year ￿xed e⁄ects will capture changes common to states over time. Furthermore,
it is likely that the direction of this bias would, if anything, attenuate the results of this
paper since wages and remittances both likely increase with the population and thus the
30I focus on the 5 largest immigrant source countries in order to avoid the potential for catostrophic
outlier events (such as the cyclone in Bangladesh in 1991 which resulted in the death of 138,000 people) to
signi￿cantly alter the sum of deaths in a particular German state.
23sample.
Nonetheless, to more carefully address these potential issues, this section utilizes a
sample that is restricted in two important dimensions. First, the sample is limited to only
natives and immigrants that were part of the original 1984 sample. The later subsamples
that were added to the SOEP data set are dropped. Second, any individual that is classi￿ed
as having died, moved abroad, or dropped out at any point in the sample is eliminated
entirely from the data set. These changes drop almost half of the native and immigrant
individuals from the data set.
Table 10 reports the results using this restricted sample. Despite the fact that the
number of observations has decreased substantially, the coe¢ cient on remittances is negative
and signi￿cant in column 1. The point estimate of -0.29 is very similar to the baseline
results of -0.25 in Table 5 and still signi￿cant at the one percent level. Remittances have
an insigni￿cant impact on the wages of native workers in traded industries (column 2) but
a negative and signi￿cant impact on the wages of workers in non-traded industries (column
3). Again, these estimated coe¢ cients are very similar to the baseline results reported in
Table 6. Thus, the key empirical ￿nding of this paper is robust to this alternate and much
more restricted sample.
7 Conclusion
This paper makes two important contributions to the existing literature. First, it provides
insight into the impact of remittances on the sending country, rather than on the foreign
receiving country. Second, in contrast to existing studies, it focuses on how immigration
a⁄ects the domestic consumer base rather than on the labor market competing impact of
immigration.
The model indicates that the e⁄ect of immigration on wages depends crucially on im-
migration￿ s impact on the size of the consumer base relative to the size of the workforce.
Remittances represent a unique way of identifying changes in this ratio, since they reduce
the consumer base but have no impact on the size of the workforce. Thus, the model
predicts that as remittances increase, the consumer base shrinks, and thus domestic wages
24decline. Furthermore, since non-traded industries are more dependent on local consumption,
remittances will have a more negative impact on the wages of workers in these industries.
The predictions of the model are tested using an unusual longitudinal data set that
includes micro-level information on remittances. Despite the potential spurious positive
bias, the OLS results indicate that remittances have a negative and signi￿cant impact on
native wages. The IV results, which eliminate these endogeneity concerns by focusing on
variation in remittances driven by foreign country factors, indicate an even more negative
relationship. A ten percent increase in remittances reduces native wages by 2.5 percent.
Finally, as predicted, remittances have a much more negative impact on the wages of workers
in non-traded industries.
Using the estimates from this paper, it is possible to perform a back-of-the-envelope
calculation to determine how much income declines due to remittances. According to the
World Bank, German remittances abroad increased by about $1b from 2007 to 2008 or
7.7%. Based on my estimates, this would lead to a reduction in national income of 1.9% or
about $730 per person in Germany in 2008. In contrast, for developing countries remittance
in￿ ows accounted for 2% of GDP in 2009 and for low-income countries remittance in￿ ows
accounted for 5.4% of GDP in 2009.31 This is a trade-o⁄ many would be willing to make,
and thus the results of this paper should not be viewed as a rational to restrict remittances.
Furthermore, the ability to remit may be an important reason to migrant, which in turn
may have positive implications for other aspects of the host economy. Thus, the policy
implications of this paper are not a critique of remittances themselves, since the bene￿ts
to many developing countries are large and well documented, but rather provide a careful
assessment of the trade-o⁄s associated with remittances.
While the results of this paper focus speci￿cally on the relationship between remittances
and wages, the implications of these results are broader. They highlight the important
impact that immigration can have on product market demand. Immigrants compete with
native workers for jobs but they also consume goods and services and this can alleviate the
labor market competing impact of immigration. An alternate interpretation of the results
in this paper, is that as the domestic consumer base grows, native wages increase. At the
31Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, World Bank.
25very least, this paper indicates that future research should think more carefully about the
implications of immigration on consumption.
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29FIGURE 1
Average Annual Remittances by West German State
Average annual real remittances sent by German immigrants abroad from 1984-2008 by West-German state.
Source:  German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).
30FIGURE 2
German Remittances by Foreign Country
Total real remittances sent by German immigrants abroad from 1984-
2008 by foreign country . Source:  German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP).
31Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln (Wage) 96,109 8.60 3.78 0 14.04
ln (Remittances) 96,109 11.47 2.10 0 14.42
Education 94,151 12.25 2.71 7 18
Age 96,109 43.96 11.97 18 65
Age Squared 96,109 2076 1061 324 4225
Married 96,109 0.60 0.49 0 1
Male 96,109 0.68 0.47 0 1
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
The sample includes 23 years (1984-2008 excluding 1992 and 1994), spans 11 West-
German states, and includes 13,708 native Germans and 5,902 immigrants.
32FIGURE 3
Residuals are obtained from separately regressing native real wages
and real remittances on the full set of controls and fixed effects.
Average wage residuals at the state-year level are then plotted against
the remittance residuals.
































Remittance data from German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).  Historical
timeline from BBC News.

















Constructing the Remittance Instrument (OLS)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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State FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes




Impact of Remittances on Native Wages (OLS)
Robust standard errors clustered at the state-year level in brackets. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Real remittances are at the state-year level.  Real native wages and
all other control variables are at the individual-year level.  Regressions weighted by
the state sample size.
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State FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 96,109 94,151
R-squared 0.913 0.914
F-Stat, Instrument 14.05 14.08
TABLE 4
First Stage IV Results
Robust standard errors clustered at the state-year level in brackets. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Remittance IV is constructed using the variation in remittances
that is due to foreign country characteristics. Regressions weighted by the state
sample size.
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State FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes




Impact of Remittances on Native Wages (IV)
Robust standard errors clustered at the state-year level in brackets. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Real remittances are at the state-year level.  Real native wages and
all other control variables are at the individual-year level. Regressions weighted by
the state sample size.
38Traded (OLS) Non-Traded (OLS) Traded (IV) Non-Traded (IV)
ln (Remittance) -0.003 -0.051** -0.023 -0.364***
[0.009] [0.020] [0.038] [0.122]
Education 0.082*** 0.143*** 0.082*** 0.143***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006]
Age 0.104*** 0.264*** 0.104*** 0.264***
[0.006] [0.014] [0.006] [0.014]
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Married 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.013
[0.016] [0.043] [0.016] [0.043]
Male 0.660*** 1.218*** 0.660*** 1.217***
[0.019] [0.050] [0.019] [0.049]
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,115 60,036 34,115 60,036
R-squared 0.189 0.557 0.189 0.556
TABLE 6
Impact of Remittances on Native Wages by Traded and Non-Traded Industries
Robust standard errors clustered at the state-year level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Traded industries
include Agriculture, Trade, Mining, Transport, Manufacturing, Energy, and Finance.  Non-Traded industries include
Services, Construction, and Other.  Regressions weighted by the state sample size.
39Total Traded Industries Non-Traded Industries
ln (Remittance) -0.218** 0.010 -0.321**
[0.089] [0.042] [0.131]
ln (Immigration) -0.372 -0.366** -0.480
[0.337] [0.184] [0.481]
Education 0.124*** 0.082*** 0.143***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.006]
Age 0.234*** 0.104*** 0.264***
[0.010] [0.006] [0.014]
Age Squared -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Married 0.008 0.003 0.013
[0.028] [0.016] [0.043]
Male 1.020*** 0.660*** 1.216***
[0.033] [0.019] [0.049]
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 94151.000 34115.000 60036.000
R-squared 0.584 0.189 0.556
TABLE 7
Impact of Remittances on Native Wages (IV) including Immigration
Robust standard errors clustered at the state-year level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Real
remittances and the immigrant share of the population are at the state-year level.  Real native wages and all
other control variables are at the individual-year level. Regressions weighted by the state sample size.
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First Stage Results using Natural Disaster Deaths as IV
Robust standard errors clustered at the state-year level in brackets. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Natural Disaster Deaths IV is constructed by summing the
deaths due to natural disasters in the immigrants home country. Regressions
weighted by the state sample size.
41Total Traded Industries Non-Traded Industries
ln (Remittance) -0.385** -0.091 -0.491**
[0.160] [0.078] [0.204]
Education 0.124*** 0.082*** 0.143***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.006]
Age 0.234*** 0.104*** 0.264***
[0.010] [0.006] [0.014]
Age Squared -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Married 0.007 0.003 0.013
[0.028] [0.016] [0.043]
Male 1.020*** 0.660*** 1.216***
[0.033] [0.019] [0.049]
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 94,151 34,115 60,036
R-squared 0.583 0.188 0.555
Robust standard errors clustered at the state-year level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Real remittances
are at the state-year level.  Real native wages and all other control variables are at the individual-year level.
Regressions weighted by the state sample size.
TABLE 9
Impact of Remittances on Native Wages (IV) using Natural Disaster Deaths as IV
42Total Traded Industries Non-Traded Industries
ln (Remittance) -0.290*** -0.051 -0.411***
[0.090] [0.039] [0.125]
Education 0.103*** 0.074*** 0.116***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.006]
Age 0.236*** 0.106*** 0.272***
[0.013] [0.007] [0.018]
Age Squared -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Married 0.051 -0.016 0.096
[0.044] [0.020] [0.067]
Male 1.090*** 0.636*** 1.349***
[0.045] [0.028] [0.062]
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52,267 20,086 32,181
R-squared 0.562 0.173 0.536
TABLE 10
Impact of Remittances on Native Wages (IV) using Restricted Sample
Robust standard errors clustered at the state-year level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Real
remittances  are at the state-year level.  Real native wages and all other control variables are at the individual-
year level. Regressions weighted by the state sample size. Sample only includes natives and immigrants that
were included in the original 1984 sample and that did not die, move abroad, or drop out of the sample.
43A Appendix
Taking the natural log of equations (7) and (8) gives:
lnw = ln(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ lnC + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿lnK + (1 ￿ ￿)lnL] ￿ lnL
and
lnr = ln(￿) + ￿(lnC) + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿lnK + (1 ￿ ￿)lnL] ￿ lnK
Rearranging the latter equation and di⁄erentiating leads to the following immigration-





Not surprisingly, this term is positive which indicates that as the workforce increases
due to immigration, the capital stock will increase as well. With product market neutrality
(￿ = 1), this relationship equals one which indicates that the capital stock will grow at the
same rate as the immigration-induced change in labor supply.
Di⁄erentiating the logw equation, using the immigration-induced change in the capital
stock equation, gives:
dlnw





+ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1
or
(10)dlnw
dlnL =
￿(￿￿1)
1￿(1￿￿)￿.
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